The Determinants and Effects of Training at Work: Bringing the Workplace Back In. ESRI WP289. April 2009 by O'Connell, Philip J. & Byrne, Delma
  
www.esri.ie 
 
Working Paper No. 289 
 
April 2009 
 
The Determinants and Effects of Training at Work:  
Bringing the Workplace Back In 
Philip J. O’Connell and Delma Byrne  
 
Abstract: This paper brings together two research fields: on work-related 
training and high performance work practices (HPWP), respectively. We 
estimate models of both the determinants and the impact of training using the 
NCPP/ESRI Changing Workplace Survey.  Our models of the determinants of 
training confirm previous research: age, education, contract, tenure, and firm 
size all influence training. Several components of HPWP are associated with a 
higher probability of training, specifically, general (non-firm-specific) training. 
Participation in general training is associated with higher earnings, as is 
involvement in highly participative and consultative working arrangements, and 
performance reward systems. These patterns of training, and returns to training, 
are broadly consistent with HPWP approaches and represent a challenge to 
human capital theory. 
 
Corresponding Author: philip.oconnell@esri.ie 
 
 
 
 
ESRI working papers represent un-refereed work-in-progress by members who are solely 
responsible for the content and any views expressed therein. Any comments on these papers 
will be welcome and should be sent to the author(s) by email. Papers may be downloaded for 
personal use only. 
The Determinants and Effects of Training at Work:  
Bringing the Workplace Back In 
 
1. Introduction 
The resurgence of interest in recent years in the importance of education and training in 
furthering the goals of economic progress, fuller employment and social integration 
coincides with a new emphasis on the need for ‘life long learning’, both to respond to 
current changes in the organisation and technology of production and service delivery 
and to counter the socially disruptive effects of increased labour market flexibility. Most 
research on continuing vocational training suggests that participation is highly selective: 
those with higher educational attainment receive more training than the low-skilled, and 
the employed receive more training than the unemployed, who in turn receive more 
training than those not economically active.  
 
This resurgence of interest in learning coincides with renewed interest in the features of 
organisations that promote organisational performance and enterprise profitability. 
These organisational factors include high performance work practices (HPWP) such as 
team-working, employee involvement and innovative incentive systems, as well as new 
technology and labour force flexibility.  
 
In general research has tended to deal with these two important fields of inquiry in a 
fragmented manner, despite their obvious inter-connections in the workplace. This 
paper combines the two perspectives.  In examining the determinants of training at work 
we look not only at the influence of personal and job characteristics, but also at the 
impact of high performance work practices and other dimension of change in the 
workplace. In looking at the impact of training on employee wages, we also examine the 
impact of high performance working arrangements and, examine whether training has a 
greater impact when it is combined with such innovative working arrangements.  In the 
next section we outline two competing theoretical approaches which have important 
implications for workplace training: human capital and HPWP approaches.  In Section 3 
we review the research findings relating to the determinants of training and, in Section 
4, its effects on wages. Section 5 presents our data and findings, and finally, Section 6 
presents our conclusions.    
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2. Theoretical Framework 
The dominant theoretical framework informing most of the research attempting to 
understand patterns of participation in training has been the human capital approach. 
This approach, deriving from Becker (1975), situates the training participation decision 
in a classical utility maximising framework within competitive labour markets: 
individual workers undertake training, and employers invest in training, on the basis of 
their estimates of future returns (including employment prospects and wages for the 
former, and productivity gains for the latter). With regard to training at work, the human 
capital approach emphasises the key distinction between “general” versus “specific” 
training. General training is defined in terms of its transferability: general training may 
be of use to current and subsequent employers, whereas specific training is of use only 
to the current employer. In this approach employers will be unlikely to pay for general 
training. If employers were to pay for general training, they would have to recoup the 
cost by paying a wage below marginal productivity after training, and in a competitive 
labour market, the workers would leave to earn their full marginal product with another 
employer. This gives rise to the poaching problem whereby ‘non-training’ employers 
can pay higher rates to workers who have received general training from a previous 
employer. This has obvious implications for who bears the cost of training, and a 
consequence of this market failure is that there is under-investment in training.   
Extensions of the theory suggest that employees pay for general training, either directly 
or in the form of lower wages during the training period.  
 
This hypothesis does not receive much support from the empirical literature, which has 
found: (1) that the theoretical distinction is difficult to operationalise; and (2) that many 
employers pay for both general and specific training. Most job-related training appears 
to be general and at least partially paid for by the employer. This is confirmed by 
findings from Booth & Bryan (2002) in relation to the United Kingdom, from Pischke 
(2000) in Germany, Loewenstein & Spletzer (1999) and Bishop (1996) in the US. For 
example, Booth & Bryan (2002) found that about 85% of respondents to the British 
Household Panel Survey considered their training to be general in nature and 89% 
reported that it was employer financed. O’Connell (2004) shows that almost 80% of 
employees in an Irish survey who received employer-sponsored training considered that 
the training was general and could be used both in their current job or be of use to 
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another employer. Evertsson’s (2004) analysis of an employee survey in Sweden shows 
that only about 5% of training is regarded as firm-specific in Sweden, another 38% is 
industry- but not firm-specific and over half is general and fully portable across sectors 
and firms.   
 
A key assumption of the human capital approach is that labour markets are perfectly 
competitive, which is, of course, an idealized notion. This assumption underpins the 
idea that employees can capture the full return on the investment in (general) training, 
either by earning their marginal product with their current employer or by moving to a 
different employer. Much of the recent literature has challenged this assumption. An 
important paper by Acemoglu & Pischke (1999) argues that compressed wage 
structures, which may arise due to trade union organisation, or to collective bargaining 
at sectoral or national levels, alter the incentive structure and give rise to a situation in 
which wages of trained workers, relative to untrained, are held down, with the result 
that employers can capture at least some of the returns to training. Other reasons 
advanced for why employers may pay for general training also emphasise departures 
from perfect competition in the labour market, including transaction costs (including 
asymmetrical information) and institutional factors (including trade unions and internal 
labour markets), and labour market regulation (such as employment protection 
legislation or minimum wages) (Acemoglu & Pischke 1999). Much of the empirical 
literature suggests that institutions are important in moderating the influence of 
competitive labour markets and thus lowering the barriers to employer sponsorship of 
training in general, and general training in particular.  Loewenstein & Spletzer (1998) 
develop a model in which training is determined within long-term contracts, including 
minimum wage guarantees. Bassanini & Brunello (2003) in an analysis of ECHP data 
for 7 countries, find that the incidence of general training (proxied by off site training) is 
higher in sectors with lower differentials between wage growths of trained versus 
untrained workers. They find no evidence of a relationship between firm-specific 
training and the training wage premium. Brunello (2001) finds that countries with 
higher union density, stronger employment protection, and lower minimum wages, tend 
to show higher incidence of training.  
 
The development of the human capital approach led to an emphasis on the competitive 
labour market, arguably, mainly on the supply side, and to the neglect of processes, 
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institutions and relationships in the workplace. Rapid developments in the organisation 
and technology of production and service delivery in a context of progressive 
globalisation have led to increased attention to the way work is organised and the 
adoption of High Performance Work Practices (HPWP). We use HPWP as a summary 
term to refer to a collection of arguments suggesting that alternative systems for the 
organisation of work, including flat hierarchical structures, team-working, greater 
participation of employees in decision-making, quality programmes,  job-rotation and 
innovative payment or incentive schemes (see Mandel & Levine 2004; Appelbaum & 
Blatt 1994). The central argument uniting the various strands of the approach is that the 
adoption of HPWP can benefit employers, through enhanced productivity and 
performance, and their employees through higher wages and greater job-satisfaction as 
well as other subjective measures of welfare. Firms adopting HPWP are also likely to 
implement special training measures in order to enhance employees’ capacities to 
implement innovative work practices. Appelbaum et al., (2000) see training as a core 
component of HPWP, in addition to opportunities to participate in decision-making and 
incentive systems that encourage skill acquisition, participation and employee-retention.       
 
Not only are HPWP likely to increase the demand for skills and training, their adoption 
also has implications for the types of training in which employers will be willing to 
invest.  Successful implementation of HPWP requires enhanced capacity of workers 
directly involved in production and service delivery to perform more complex tasks, or 
to conduct statistical analysis of quality issues, or to use soft skills such as problem-
solving or interaction skills in order to facilitate effective team working (Osterman 
2006). Most of these skill requirements appear general in nature. In this respect HPWP 
differs sharply form the human capital approach, which expects that employers will not 
pay for general training. This is not to say that training within a HPWP context is 
exclusively general.  Handel & Levine (2004) argue that new work practices may also 
require more firm-specific skills.    
 
HPWP represent a context in which innovative work practices are complemented by 
skill development practices as well as employee retention and security policies 
(Appelbaum et al., 2000; Godard 2001). To the extent that HPWP entail expectations of 
enduring employment relationships, employers need to worry less that trained 
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employees will be poached by other employers – a key barrier to training investment 
identified by the human capital approach – and thus may be more willing to provide 
both general and firm specific training.  
3. Determinants of Training 
There is a substantial body of evidence indicating that in-career training is highly 
stratified, with the result that those with higher skills, or educational attainment are 
more likely to participate in training, and in training sponsored by their employers 
(Lynch 1994; OECD 1999; O’Connell 2002b; Schömann 1998; Blundell et al., 1996). 
The employed receive more training than the unemployed, who in turn receive more 
training than those not economically active (O’Connell, 1999). Older workers are also 
less likely to participate in job-related training (Gelderblom & de Koning, 2003). Larger 
firms and those that pay above average wages are also more likely to train their 
employees (O’Connell 2002b). Part-time workers and those on temporary contracts are 
less likely to receive training (Arulampalam & Booth, 1998). These patterns of 
participation suggest that current allocation principles are in inverse relation to need and 
training is more likely to exacerbate rather than mitigate existing labour market 
inequalities. Becker (1999) summarizes the findings of several empirical evaluations of 
training programs in Germany: access to further professional training is highly 
selective. The selectivity of further education triggers labour market segmentation and 
social exclusion of underprivileged workers as well as the general inequality of life 
chances. This seems to be true for on-the-job training as well as for training outside the 
workplace. Participation in further education and training depends on participation in 
prior vocational training. Qualified employees have advantageous access to training 
compared to skilled workers, whose access is still better than for the low-skilled 
workers (O’Connell et al., 2002b).  
 
In general, there is little evidence to suggest any marked gender differences in access to 
training. For example, O’Connell (1999) shows that the incidence of training is similar 
for men and women across a range of OECD member countries. However, Evertsson 
(2004) shows that in Sweden women are less likely than men to participate in formal 
on-the-job training.  Participation in training has also been found to decline over the life 
course. This may be due to the difficulty in recouping the costs of training in either 
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wages or productivity among older workers, given that the time-span for cost recovery 
is shorter among older workers (see Gelderblom & de Koning 2002 for Dutch data). In 
the UK a great deal of training has been found to be induction training of new recruits 
(Booth & Bryan 2002), although this age-related pattern in training participation may 
differ between occupational groups.  
 
Most information on continuing education and training derives from individual level 
survey data. However, research on enterprises confirms the stratified nature of training 
participation. Hughes et al., (2004) show that firms engage in more training of their 
employees when they experience labour and skill shortages. However, while the 
vacancy rate among professional and technical workers is associated with an increase in 
training, vacancies among low skilled workers have no impact on enterprises’ training 
activities. In general, research on firms suggests that both the incidence and intensity of 
training is higher in firms characterized by relatively advantaged workforces – in 
organisations where average wages are higher, and where greater proportions of the 
workforce are in higher level occupations or possess higher skills (Booth & Zoega 
2000; O’Connell 2002b; Lynch 1994). The nature of the firm plays an important role.  
 
Trade unions represent an important labour market institution that may affect training 
either directly, through training agreements, or indirectly, through wage bargaining. The 
empirical results on the impact of unions on training are mixed. A number of studies 
have found a positive impact of union membership or presence on training: for example, 
in the US (Lynch 1992), the UK (Booth et al., 2003), and in Germany (Dustman & 
Schönberg 2004). On the other hand, however, Mincer (1983) and Barron et al., (1987) 
find negative effects for the US, and Bassanini et al., (2005) find no significant effect of 
unions across the 13 countries covered by the European Community Household Panel 
Survey. 
 
There are a limited number of studies examining the impact of HPWP on training. 
Osterman (1995) in an analysis of firm-level data in the US shows that new forms of 
work organisation are associated with higher rates of training. He finds that the main 
influential factors are related to quality practices: Quality Circles, Total Quality 
Management and Statistical Process Control each led to increased training. Other more 
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direct work practices, such as team working and job rotation did not. His findings also 
suggest that the adoption of these work practices are short-term, but do not endure over 
time. Osterman (1995) also found that enterprises that responded positively to a 
question about their commitment to increasing “the well-being of employees with 
respect to their personal or family situation” showed higher rates of training.  This may 
be a proxy for progressive employment policies.  
 
O’Connell (2007) shows that the presence of participation arrangements for deciding 
how work is actually carried out is associated with a higher probability of training. 
Similarly, employees reporting extensive consultation relating to their jobs are also 
more likely to have participated in training. These work practices are also associated 
with an increased likelihood of participation in general rather than firm-specific 
training.  Similarly, Lynch & Black (1998) find that new workplace practices such as 
Total Quality Management and benchmarking are linked with more general types of 
training programmes. 
4. Wage Effects of Training and High Performance Work Practices 
The wealth of empirical research on the labour market effects of initial education (see 
for example De la Fuente & Ciccone 2002) stands in stark contrast to the paucity of 
research on the effects of continuing vocational training, which can still be characterised 
as a developing field of inquiry. Most empirical work suggests that there are positive 
wage returns to training. Blundell et al., (1996) find positive wage returns to training in 
the UK. Schömann & Becker (2002) find similar effects in Germany. However, wage 
returns to training appear to be low in France, at least in the short-term perspective 
(Goux & Maurin 1998).  However, it should be acknowledged that when selection 
effects are controlled for, the returns are frequently found to be small or even non-
significant.  
 
Brunello (2001) in an analysis of European Community Household Panel data for 13 
European countries finds that training, both on- and off-the-job, increases current 
earnings growth although this earnings growth is likely to be temporary. Earnings 
growth is somewhat higher for those with upper secondary education than those with 
tertiary education, and that among the latter the returns to training decline with labour 
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market experience, perhaps because educational qualifications become outdated over an 
extensive period of time. 
 
One of the interesting findings from the literature on the impact of training is that the 
wage returns may be higher among those with low propensity to participate in training 
(e.g. Bartel 1995 in the U.S.; Blundell et al., 1996; and Booth 1991 in the U.K.; Pischke 
1996 in Germany). Higher returns to training among groups with low rates of training 
participation (such as those with low educational attainment) could be due to selection 
effects, but could also be due to higher returns to training among those with poor 
qualifications who nevertheless work in the primary segment of the labour market, or, in 
the formulation of Booth & Zoega (2002), in ‘good’ firms, where the average stock of 
human capital is high.  
 
With regard to the returns to training, human capital theory anticipates that the returns, 
in the form of wages, are positive and “smooth”, so that additional periods of continuing 
vocational training should have, on average, positive and linear effects on wages. Again, 
however, institutional factors, including wage compression and differential labour 
mobility may alter the returns to training in differing institutional contexts, for example, 
across countries. However, recent literature again challenges the human capital 
approach and the key issue is the departure from a perfectly competitive labour market. 
While human capital theory assumes a competitive labour market in which trained 
employees receive their marginal product, and thus the full fruits of their labour 
enhanced by training, in a non-competitive labour market workers may not receive their 
full marginal product and the benefits of training may be shared between employer and 
employee. There is some evidence that the benefits of training are shared between 
employer and employee. Barron et al., (1989) found that the benefits of training are split 
more or less equally between productivity gains reaped by employers and wage 
increases to employees in the US. Dearden et al., (2000) show that the effect of training 
on productivity was twice as large as that on wages in a panel study of British 
industries. Other studies that have looked at the impact of training on corporate 
performance also suggest that employers do appropriate at least some of the returns to 
training investments. These outcomes are consistent with the contracting model 
advanced by Loewenstein & Spletzer (1998), in which training is determined within 
long-term contracts, including minimum wage guarantees. This would also be supported 
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by the finding that general training increases company turnover or sales (Barrett & 
O’Connell 2001). 
 
Some of the returns to training are captured by workers either with a time lag or when 
they change employers. Loewenstein & Spletzer (1999) find that the estimated effect of 
general training in a previous job is three times higher than in the current job. Booth & 
Bryan (2002) find that employer provided training increases wages in both current and 
future firms and that the impact is larger in future firms. These effects suggest that 
employers have some monopsony power over their own trained workers so that trained 
workers may not receive their marginal product, and that training, including general 
training paid for by employers may be transferable across jobs. These effects are not 
consistent with the implications of the human capital approach and the assumption of a 
competitive labour market. Of interest here is that the empirical research on the 
incidence and effects of training may be of interest not only in its own right, but may 
also have important implications for the dominant theoretical framework informing our 
understanding of the relationship between human capital formation and labour market 
behaviour. 
 
Empirical evidence of the impact of training at the level of the enterprise is less 
developed than the evidence relating to individuals, although there is a growing 
literature which suggests that training increases the productivity of firms and leads to 
higher earnings for trained personnel. Quantitative analysis of enterprise-level data has 
tended to focus more on the effects of training on company performance (e.g. Barrett & 
O’Connell 2001; Bartel 1989; Holzer et al., 1993); although several studies have found 
evidence of positive effects of training on wages (Bartel 1995; Booth 1991; 
Loewenstein & Spletzer 1997; Goux & Maurin 1997). Moreover, a number of studies 
have found that training enhances both company performance and workers’ wages 
(Bishop 1994; Groot & Osterbeek 1995). 
 
Research on the impact of HPWP is growing, and covers the effects on both employers 
and employees.  However, research on the impact of such practices on wages remains 
somewhat sparse (see Handel & Levine 2004 for a review).  Apelbaum et al., (2000) in 
their study of the steel, apparel and medical instruments industries in the US, show that 
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teamwork and an index of HPWP were associated with higher earnings in steel and 
apparel, but not in medical instruments.  Batt (2001) found that work discretion was 
positively associated with earnings, but that team and quality circles were not when 
appropriate controls were included in her model. Cappelli & Neumark (2001) find 
higher earnings associated with HPWP in a national survey of US manufacturing 
establishments, but Black et al., (2004) working with the same data, find positive effects 
of HPWP are confined to unionized workplaces. Osterman (2000) found no effect of 
HPWP in his study of a survey of establishments. However, Osterman (2006) found 
increased wages among blue collar workers, attributable to increased productivity, as 
well as increased earnings among managers, achieved though different channels.  
5. Data and Findings  
The paper draws on the NCPP/ESRI Changing Workplace Survey conducted by the 
Economic and Social Research Institute and commissioned by the Irish National Centre 
for Partnership and Performance (O’Connell et al., 2004).  This is a sample survey of 
5,200 employees, conducted in mid 2003, designed to collect information relating to 
characteristics of jobs and workplaces, workplace practices, participation and 
involvement, experience of and attitudes to change, as well as a series of conventional 
socio-demographic indicators (age, gender, education, occupation etc.).  The survey also 
collects a small but useful set of indicators of employer-sponsored training, including 
duration and whether the training is general or specific in nature.  Binary and 
multinomial probit models are used to assess the determinants of training.  With respect 
to the methodology used to model the impact of training on earnings, we begin with a 
standard Mincer type wage model and then include relevant variables. Sample means 
and training rates are shown in Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Training Patterns  
Table 1 also presents descriptive training patterns according to personal characteristics, 
job characteristics and organisational characteristics. Overall 48% of employees report 
that they participated in training provided by their present employer over the last two 
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years.  We now see that the variation in employer-sponsored training incidence 
according to these characteristics reveals a familiar pattern.  Of particular interest is that 
males are slightly more likely than females to participate in training.  Workers aged 25-
39 are most likely to receive training, and training incidence declines substantially 
among those aged 55 years and over.  Training participation is closely linked to 
educational attainment: only 34% of those with no qualifications received training, 
compared to almost 60% of those with third level qualifications.   
 
There is also variation in training according to job characteristics.  We see that the terms 
of employment of the position are important: full-time workers are more likely to 
receive training than part-time workers; permanent workers receive more training than 
those on temporary contracts.  Tenure is also important, with all those who have been in 
a job for more than a year more likely to receive training than those who have less than 
a year of job tenure.  Those with five or more years with their current employer show a 
slightly lower training incidence than those with 1-5 years tenure, but this difference is 
not statistically significant.  Union members are substantially more likely to have 
participated in training than non-members.  
 
In relation to organisational characteristics, training is much more common in the public 
sector: 60% of workers in the public sector, compared with 45% of those in the private 
sector participated in employer sponsored training in the previous 2 years.  There is 
some variation according to sector of employment: training incidence is highest in 
Public Administration and Defense (65%), followed by Transport and Communications 
(56%) while training incidence is lowest in Other Services (38%) (Results not tabulated 
here).  Training is also strongly influenced by establishment size: those working in 
establishments with 100 or more employees are twice as likely to participate in training 
as those in establishments with 1-4 employees (61% versus 24%, respectively). While 
all of these bivariate associations may provide useful insights, they are likely to suffer 
from omitted variables bias which may suggest misleading conclusions; hence in the 
following section we apply multiple regression analysis.  
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Modelling the Determinants of Training  
We now look at some estimation results from the probit models of the determinants of 
receiving any type of employer sponsored training and consider personal characteristics, 
job characteristics, organisational characteristics and high performance work practices.  
Table 2 presents a series of probit regression models of training incidence, measured as 
a binary variable, and coded 1 if any employer-sponsored training was undertaken over 
the previous two years.  Equation 1 includes only personal characteristics.  The results 
show that females are less likely than males to have participated in training.  Age is also 
influential, with those aged 25-39 more likely to receive training than the reference 
category, those aged less than 25.  As expected, educational attainment is important: 
those who have attained upper secondary or university education are more likely to have 
participated in training than those with lower levels of educational attainment. 
Employees who are married or living with a partner are also more likely to receive 
training. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Equation 2 adds job characteristics.  We now find that older workers are generally less 
likely to get trained than younger workers.  The size of the coefficients for education 
levels have diminished but remain significant.  In line with our expectations, temporary 
workers are less likely to have received training than permanent employees, as are part 
time workers relative to full time workers.  Also as expected, those with shorter tenure 
in their present position are less likely to train than those with longer tenure. Union 
members/members of staff associations are also more likely to have trained. Inclusion 
of job characteristics eliminates the observed gender differences in training 
participation. 
 
Equation 3 then considers organisational characteristics and change.1    Size is 
important: the larger the organisation, the greater the likelihood than an employee has 
                                                 
1 In this and all subsequent analyses, models that include Organisational characteristics also include 
sectoral dummy variabels but are not shown in the tables because of space considertations.  In the present 
analysis we found that construction workers were more likely to have trained than those in 
manufacturing, but that no other sector showed any significant differences.  
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participated in training.  Furthermore, employees working for companies that are part of 
a larger organisation are also more likely to receive training than those who are not.  In 
addition, organisational changes in the past two years such as the introduction of 
substantial new technology, the appointment of a new chief executive or equivalent, or 
the introduction of family friendly policies are all associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of training.  When these organisational characteristics are added to the model, 
we now see that the size of the coefficients for employee education levels have 
diminished but remain significant.  Being married is no longer a significant determinant 
of receiving training, nor is working hours.   
 
Equation 4 then adds a series of high performance work practices, relating to the 
implementation of specific policies and employee involvement and the workplace ethos. 
Participation is a dichotomous variable scored 1 if employees report that their employer 
provides them with a direct say in the way in which work is actually carried out 
(including working in teams, problem solving groups, quality circles, continuous 
programmes or groups).  Consultation is a scale variable indicating the frequency with 
which employees are consulted about decisions affecting their work, as well as whether 
any attention is paid to their views.  We also constructed three scales to capture various 
aspects of working practices. Performance Reward Systems is composed of 3 items: 
performance related pay, performance review system and profit share policy 
(Cronbach’s Alpha=.56). Progressive Employment Policies is composed of 2 items: 
employer policies on equal opportunities and on respect and dignity at work (anti-
bullying) (Cronbach’s Alpha=.72). Flexible Work Practices includes opportunities to 
work part-time hours, job-sharing and flexi-time policies (Cronbach’s Alpha=.54). 
Employees who report that their organisation provides opportunities to participate 
directly in how work is carried out are more likely to have received training.  Similarly, 
those who report greater levels of consultation are more likely to have received training 
than those who do not.  Employees working in organisations that have performance 
reward systems or progressive employment policies are more likely to have received 
training, but those with flexible working arrangements do not.  
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Distinguishing between General and Specific Training  
One of the key distinctions in the economics of training is that between “general” versus 
“specific” training.  General training is defined in terms of its transferability: general 
training may be of use to both current and subsequent employers, whereas specific 
training is of use only to the current employer.  In the Survey of Employees Attitudes 
and Experiences of the Workplace respondents who indicated that they had participated 
in employer education or training provided by their employer over the past 2 years were 
asked:  
 
Do you feel that the skills or knowledge which you have acquired in this 
education or training would be of any use to you in getting a job with 
another employer or was the education or training specific to your current 
job only? 
 
Of use in getting job with another employer 1  
Of use only in current job ............................ 2 
80% of all education and training undertaken by employees with employer sponsorship 
was general in nature, considered by respondents to be “Of use in getting a job with 
another employer”.  Only about 20% of training was considered to be specific, “of use 
only in current job.”  This pattern, whereby most training is general in nature is similar 
to that found in other countries (see, for example, Booth & Bryan 2002 in the United 
Kingdom; Pischke 2000 in Germany; and Loewenstein & Spletzer 1999 in the US).  
Women are somewhat more likely than men to report that their training was general in 
nature.   
 
Previous analysis of this dataset (O’Connell, 2007) shows that older workers are less 
likely than their younger colleagues to participate in general training, and that a 
somewhat greater proportion of those without any qualifications who received training 
reported that it was general in nature, compared to those with higher levels of 
educational attainment.  There were no significant differences in the nature of training 
between full- and part-time workers, or between employees on temporary versus 
permanent contracts, although as we have seen, permanent workers are much more 
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likely to receive training than temporary workers.  Public sector workers are more likely 
than those in the private sector to have participated in training in the past two years and 
a substantially greater proportion of training in the public sector is specific to the 
current employer (30%) than is the case in the private sector (18%).  The balance 
between general versus specific training does not vary much by size of organisation.  
 
In order to model the determinants of different types of training, Table 3 reports the 
results of a multinomial probit estimation, showing participation in either general or 
specific training contrasted with no training. As expected, overall the patterns differ 
markedly between the two types of training.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
In most respects, the factors that influence participation in any kind of training also 
influence general training. This is perhaps not surprising given that about 80% of all 
training is regarded as general in nature. There are no gender differences, but older 
employees are less likely to receive general training than no training relative to their 
younger counterparts. Those in shorter tenure are less likely to get trained than those 
with more than 5 years of tenure with the current employer while those with medium 
term tenure are more likely to get trained than the former reference group.  Union 
members/members of staff association are more likely than non members to get general 
training than no training.  Size is also positively associated with general training. In 
relation to organisational change, the appointment of a new chief executive or 
equivalent and the introduction of new technology are associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of general training.   
 
Employees who report that their organisation encourages direct participation in 
workplace decisions, or greater levels of consultation about their work are more likely 
to have received general training than those who do not. Furthermore, employees who 
report that their workplace implements performance reward systems or progressive 
employment policies are more likely to receive training. These outcomes are entirely 
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consistent with the expectations and findings of previous HPWP research.  The presence 
of flexible working arrangements had no significant effect on general training.  
 
The determinants of specific training are quite different. Gender is significant indicating 
than women are less likely to receive specific training than men. Education is a 
significant determinant of receiving specific training but only those with an upper 
secondary education are more likely to receive training than those with lower levels of 
educational attainment. Being a trade union member also increases the likelihood of 
receiving specific training. Workers who work in companies that are part of a larger 
organisation also have an increased likelihood of specific training. Those who have seen 
the introduction of new technology are more likely to have received specific training.  
Two work practices are associated with increased firm-specific training: direct 
participation and progressive employment policies.   
Wage Effects of Training and HPWP 
We now turn to the results from the analyses of earnings. Our measure for earnings is 
the log of hourly net rate of pay for each individual employee.  Because net earnings are 
used, it is important to include marital status in the wage equation because of Irish tax 
law, which despite elements of individualisation of the tax code, nevertheless provides 
substantial tax breaks for married couples.  The mean hourly earnings for our sample as 
a whole is €13.27.  For those who received training in the past two years, hourly 
earnings are €14.23, compared to €12.30 for those who did not receive training.  This 
simple mean based comparison strongly suggests lower earnings for those who have 
received training relative to those who have not.  We conduct regression analysis to see 
if the pay difference remains when we control for the variety of factors that influence 
earnings other than participation in training. We estimate standard OLS Mincer type 
wage equations in which the standard controls are included in Table 4 and Table 5 
which present the results.  In Table 4 we include a dummy variable indicating if an 
employee has received training in the past two years; and in Table 5 we include two 
dummy variables indicating if an employee has received general training or specific 
training in the past two years.  At this point we are taking a simple approach and 
delaying a discussion of selection effects until later in the text.  
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Equation 1 in Table 4 includes only personal characteristics.  We find that those who 
have received training in the past two years receive on average 10% higher wages than 
those who have not.  Females earn 15% less than males, older workers earn more than 
younger workers, and those with higher levels of education earn more than those with 
lower levels of educational attainment.  Those who are married earn more than those 
who are not married.   
 
Equation 2 then includes job characteristics. We now see that the addition of job 
characteristics reduces the returns to training: those who have received training in the 
past two years receive on average 7% higher wages than those who have not.  Females 
now earn 16% less than males.  Those with higher levels of education continue to earn 
more than those with lower levels of educational attainment as do those who are 
married.  As expected, workers on temporary contracts earn less than those on 
permanent contracts and those with lower tenure earn less than those with longer tenure.  
Part-time workers earn higher hourly wages than full-time employees; trade union/staff 
association members earn higher wages than non members.  
 
Equation 3 adds variables pertaining to organisation characteristics and change.  We 
now see that the return to training has reduced substantially to less than 4%.  The 
patterns outlined above in relation to personal and job characteristics remain largely 
stable.  In relation to the new variables added to the model, we now see that those 
working in the public sector earn about 7% more than those working in the private 
sector.  Size also matters for wages, with those working in larger organisations earning 
more than those working in smaller organisations.  Furthermore, employees working in 
companies that are part of a larger organisation earn higher wages.  Work organisation 
changes are not significantly related to wages, but the introduction of new technology 
does increase wages.  
 
Equation 4 then includes high performance work practice variables. The presence of 
arrangements for participation, the strength of consultation and the importance of 
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performance reward systems, key components identified by the HPWP literature, are 
each associated with higher wages. Neither progressive employment policies nor 
flexible working arrangements have any significant impact. The addition of these 
HPWP variables now reduces the return to training to just less than 3%.   
 
Finally, equation 5 examines whether training has a greater impact when combined with 
HPWP by specifying interaction terms between training and each of participation, 
consultation and performance reward systems.  None of the interaction terms reach 
significance suggesting that the effect of training on wages does not differ significantly 
across work practices. 
Returns to General/Specific Training  
Table 5 considers the returns to general and specific training.  Equation 1 presents the 
results in relation to personal characteristics.  Here the return to general training is 
higher than the return to specific training; 10% compared to 8% respectively.  Equation 
2 then adds job characteristics and we now see that the return to specific training is 
eliminated. However, those who have received general training in the past two years 
earn 8% more than those who did not receive any training.  Equation 3 then adds 
organisational characteristics and while we see the persistence of a return to general 
training relative to having not received any training, the return has reduced by 2% when 
characteristics of organisation structure and change are taken into account.  The 
inclusion of work practices in Equation 4 reduces the return to general training to less 
than 4%.  As in Table 4, above, before, none of the interactions between general 
training and HPWP - participation, consultation or performance reward systems - 
achieved statistical significance suggesting that the effect of general training on wages 
does not vary across work practices.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The OLS estimates from Table 4 (and Table 5) do not account for the endogenous 
decision to participate in training.  Individuals who receive training may be substantially 
different to those not receiving training either in terms of individual or workplace 
characteristics (including HPWP) and thus standard regression estimation methods may 
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produce biased estimates of the effect of training on wages.  This potential difficulty can 
be rectified by using propensity score matching estimators instead of the usual OLS 
method.  By matching treatment (those who received training) and control (those who 
did not receive training) groups that are similar in terms of observed individual, job and 
work practice characteristics, the propensity score matching procedure produces 
unbiased estimates of the effect of training on wages.  We thus compare the wages of 
individuals who participate in training to a group of workers who do not participate in 
training.  To establish an adequate control group, we have to match individuals by 
employing the predicted values from the full participation model reported as Equation 4 
in Table 4. We apply four matching procedures, nearest neighbour, kernel matching, 
stratification and local linear regression and ensure common support.  Table 6 displays 
the estimated returns to training resulting from different propensity matching methods.  
The propensity score models produce estimates of the returns to training that are 
consistently close both in terms of value and significance levels, to those of the OLS 
model reported in Table 4.  Therefore, using this approach we can conclude that the 
estimated returns to training are robust with respect to possible selection bias.  
Furthermore, by using this approach, it ensures that levels of estimation bias are greatly 
reduced by comparing the outcomes of individuals in the treatment and control groups 
who hold very similar characteristics in terms of individual, job and work practice 
characteristics.  
6. Conclusion  
This paper started from the premise that the workplace is an important site for the 
accumulation of human capital. Our approach, therefore, has been to attempt to bring 
together two research fields: the large and relatively sophisticated training literature 
with a growing literature on workplace practices.  Our findings suggest that workplaces 
are indeed important. 
 
We estimate models of both the determinants and the impact of training.  Our model of 
training participation confirms much of the existing literature: age, education, type of 
contract, tenure, and firm size are all determinants of training. However, we also found 
that several work practices are also influential: involvement in highly participative or 
consultative working arrangements; as well as the existence of performance reward 
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systems and progressive employment policies are all associated with a higher 
probability of training. When we distinguish between general and firm-specific training, 
we find that several types of HPWP lead to greater levels of general training.  This is 
consistent with the implication of the HPWP literature and represents a challenge to the 
human capital approach which has difficulty explaining why employers would pay for 
general training.  
 
To asses the impact of training we estimate a series of wage models. Simple models, 
controlling for personal and job characteristics show training to have a significant 
impact on wages.  The addition of variables measuring organisational characteristics 
confirms that organisational factors are important influences on wages, and their 
inclusion also reduces the estimated returns to training. We also find that several 
dimensions of HPWP, particularly participation, consultation and performance reward 
systems, have a significant impact on wages, and when these variables are specified in 
the model  training continues to show a modest return. These returns are confined to 
general training: we find no significant returns to firm-specific training.    
 
We have shown that individuals who are involved in highly participative and 
consultative working arrangements, and in organisations that implement performance 
reward systems, are more likely to train, and to earn more, than those who are not.  To 
assess whether training has a greater impact when combined with these HPWP we 
specify a series of interaction terms between training and HPWP, but found no evidence 
of a wage return to such “bundles” of practices. 
 
The literature on the returns to training acknowledges that individuals who receive 
training may be substantially different to those not receiving training either in terms of 
individual or workplace characteristics (including HPWP) and thus standard regression 
estimation methods may produce biased estimates of the effect of training on wages.  
We apply a propensity score matching technique to ensure that our estimated returns to 
training are robust with respect to possible selection bias.  
 
We believe that the contribution of this paper is to suggest that future attempts to 
rigorously estimate the impact of training on wages should take account of the 
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workplace and the social relations within it.  Our findings suggest that observed patterns 
of training, and of returns to training are broadly consistent with the implications of the 
HPWP approach and represent a challenge to elements of the human capital approach.  
 
 
Table 1: Sample means and standard deviations (weighted) 
 Variable Mean Training Rate 
Training    
Any training  .50 50.0 
   
Personal Characteristics    
Female  .53 46.2 
Age 25-39 .34 49.3 
Age 40-54 .38 50.3 
Age 55+ .10 46.9 
Leaving Certificate  .33 49.2 
University  .42 59.4 
Married  .55 46.6 
   
Job Characteristics    
Temporary Contract .16 37.0 
29 hours or less .21 39.6 
< 1 year with current .15 35.8 
1-5 years current employer .32 51.1 
Trade Union Member .42 58.9 
   
Organisation Structure & Change   
Public Sector .31 60.0 
5-19 Employees .27 33.6 
20-99 Employees  .34 45.4 
100-500+ Employees  .25 53.4 
Part of larger organisation  .57  
Re-organisation of company .39 57.9 
New technology introduced  .51 58.5 
New Chief Executive  .27 63.0 
Introduction of Family Friendly Policies  .28 60.8 
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Table 2: Binary Probit Regression Model of Determinants of Participation in Training 
  Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 
  Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
                 
Constant  -0.456 0.000 -0.327 0.000 -0.801 0.000 -0.923 0.000 
Female  -0.095 0.012 -0.031 0.446 -0.042 0.344 -0.005 0.903 
Age 25-39 0.135 0.023 -0.072 0.256 -0.107 0.101 -0.131 0.050 
Age 40-54 0.107 0.095 -0.171 0.013 -0.231 0.001 -0.267 0.000 
Age 55+ -0.106 0.187 -0.379 0.000 -0.418 0.000 -0.450 0.000 
Leaving Certificate  0.312 0.000 0.295 0.000 0.251 0.000 0.187 0.001 
University  0.609 0.000 0.574 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.343 0.000 
Married  0.139 0.002 0.100 0.027 0.085 0.065 0.055 0.240 
Temporary Contract      -0.113 0.050 -0.119 0.043 -0.061 0.309 
Part Time Hours      -0.131 0.010 -0.049 0.361 -0.031 0.573 
Tenure less than 1 year     -0.335 0.000 -0.298 0.000 -0.287 0.000 
Trade Union Member      0.425 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.181 0.000 
Public Sector worker         0.116 0.142 0.136 0.091 
5-19 Employees         0.233 0.001 0.192 0.005 
20-99 Employees         0.234 0.000 0.180 0.008 
100+ Employees         0.430 0.000 0.302 0.000 
Part of Larger Organisation         0.111 0.008 0.086 0.046 
Recent Re-Organisation of company         0.051 0.263 0.027 0.570 
New technology introduced          0.195 0.000 0.151 0.000 
New Chief Executive/equivalent          0.148 0.003 0.135 0.007 
Introduction of Family Friendly policy         0.194 0.000 0.062 0.202 
Participation             0.252 0.000 
Consultation              0.083 0.000 
Performance reward systems             0.145 0.000 
Progressive employment policies             0.122 0.000 
Flexible working arrangements             0.026 0.249 
                 
N 4703   4703   4703   4681   
Chi-Square  203.18   409.22   625.69   795.92   
Pseudo R  0.0312   0.0628   0.096   0.1227   
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Table 3:  Multinomial Probit Regression of Determinants of General Training v No 
Training and Specific Training v No Training  
  General Training  Specific Training  
  Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
              
Constant  -1.955 0.211 0.000 -2.776 0.317 0.000 
Female  0.087 0.080 0.276 -0.260 0.117 0.027 
Age 25-39 -0.190 0.117 0.105 -0.389 0.181 0.032 
Age 40-54 -0.407 0.129 0.002 -0.586 0.197 0.003 
Age 55+ -0.775 0.161 0.000 -0.737 0.234 0.002 
Leaving Certificate  0.268 0.097 0.006 0.503 0.149 0.001 
University  0.579 0.101 0.000 0.494 0.155 0.001 
Married  0.091 0.083 0.272 0.063 0.122 0.603 
Temporary Contract  -0.048 0.108 0.654 -0.269 0.168 0.109 
Part Time Hours  -0.124 0.098 0.203 0.123 0.140 0.381 
Tenure less than 1 year -0.510 0.109 0.000 -0.328 0.174 0.059 
Trade Union Member  0.238 0.084 0.005 0.567 0.125 0.000 
Public Sector worker 0.206 0.143 0.149 0.239 0.199 0.230 
5-19 Employees 0.351 0.124 0.005 0.276 0.181 0.127 
20-99 Employees 0.378 0.124 0.002 0.001 0.182 0.997 
100+ Employees 0.596 0.134 0.000 0.255 0.195 0.192 
Part of Larger Organisation 0.089 0.076 0.241 0.398 0.119 0.001 
Recent Re-Organisation of company 0.043 0.082 0.603 0.103 0.119 0.387 
New technology introduced  0.231 0.075 0.002 0.311 0.112 0.006 
New Chief Executive/equivalent  0.217 0.088 0.013 0.167 0.124 0.179 
Introduction of Family Friendly policy 0.131 0.084 0.120 -0.043 0.124 0.726 
Participation 0.396 0.076 0.000 0.483 0.111 0.000 
Consultation  0.184 0.033 0.000 0.037 0.048 0.447 
Performance reward systems 0.265 0.040 0.000 0.089 0.062 0.150 
Progressive employment policies 0.206 0.040 0.000 0.175 0.063 0.006 
Flexible working arrangements 0.052 0.039 0.188 -0.003 0.057 0.961 
           
N=4633          
Chi-Square=930.89          
Pseudo R =.1044             
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Table 4:  Wage Equation 
  Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 
  Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Constant  1.925 0.000 1.968 0.000 1.836 0.000 1.861 0.000 1.847 0.000 
Train  0.104 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.036 0.001 0.028 0.009 0.059 0.020 
Female  -0.153 0.000 -0.169 0.000 -0.157 0.000 -0.155 0.000 -0.155 0.000 
Age 25-39 0.268 0.000 0.203 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.172 0.000 
Age 40-54 0.371 0.000 0.282 0.000 0.238 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.235 0.000 
Age 55+ 0.381 0.000 0.288 0.000 0.242 0.000 0.241 0.000 0.242 0.000 
Leaving Certificate  0.158 0.000 0.161 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.134 0.000 
University  0.403 0.000 0.403 0.000 0.316 0.000 0.310 0.000 0.310 0.000 
Married  0.081 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.048 0.000 
Temporary Contract      -0.105 0.000 -0.095 0.000 -0.093 0.000 -0.093 0.000 
Part Time Hours      0.107 0.000 0.104 0.000 0.104 0.000 0.104 0.000 
Tenure less than 1 year     -0.050 0.002 -0.050 0.001 -0.048 0.002 -0.048 0.002 
Trade Union Member      0.141 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.090 0.000 
Public Sector worker         0.071 0.001 0.085 0.000 0.085 0.000 
5-19 Employees         0.051 0.003 0.050 0.004 0.050 0.004 
20-99 Employees         0.085 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.079 0.000 
100+ Employees         0.092 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.077 0.000 
Part of Larger Organisation         0.007 0.530 0.004 0.746 0.004 0.705 
Recent Re-Organisation of company         0.004 0.755 -0.003 0.825 -0.003 0.822 
New technology introduced          0.021 0.065 0.019 0.084 0.019 0.087 
New Chief Executive/equivalent          0.015 0.252 0.010 0.430 0.010 0.425 
Introduction of Family Friendly policy         -0.004 0.745 -0.015 0.247 -0.015 0.243 
Participation           0.064 0.000 0.058 0.001 
Consultation (ordinal)           0.036 0.000 0.042 0.000 
Performance reward systems             0.038 0.000 0.040 0.000 
Progressive employment policies             0.005 0.411 0.005 0.416 
Flexible working arrangements             0.008 0.147 0.008 0.151 
Interaction Training*Participation                 0.011 0.614 
Interaction Training*Consultation                 -0.014 0.136 
Interaction Training*Perf Rew Sys                 -0.002 0.865 
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Table 5: Wage Equation 
  Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 
  Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Constant  1.926 0.000 1.967 0.000 1.930 0.000 1.859 0.000 1.857 0.000 
G Training  0.108 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.036 0.002 0.048 0.084 
S Training  0.086 0.000 0.040 0.023 0.016 0.353 0.001 0.968 0.002 0.922 
Female  -0.152 0.000 -0.169 0.000 -0.163 0.000 -0.155 0.000 -0.155 0.000 
Age 25-39 0.266 0.000 0.203 0.000 0.182 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.171 0.000 
Age 40-54 0.369 0.000 0.282 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.235 0.000 
Age 55+ 0.381 0.000 0.290 0.000 0.257 0.000 0.243 0.000 0.243 0.000 
Leaving Certificate 0.158 0.000 0.161 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.134 0.000 
University  0.401 0.000 0.402 0.000 0.342 0.000 0.310 0.000 0.310 0.000 
Married  0.082 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.048 0.000 
Temporary Contract      -0.102 0.000 -0.106 0.000 -0.091 0.000 -0.091 0.000 
Part Time Hours      0.107 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.104 0.000 0.105 0.000 
Tenure less than 1 year     -0.048 0.003 -0.046 0.004 -0.047 0.003 -0.047 0.003 
Trade Union Member      0.142 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.085 0.000 
Public Sector worker         0.069 0.001 0.085 0.000 0.085 0.000 
5-19 Employees         0.052 0.003 0.051 0.004 0.052 0.003 
20-99 Employees         0.077 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.078 0.000 
100+ Employees         0.090 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.075 0.000 
Part of Larger Organisation         0.002 0.842 0.005 0.656 0.021 0.132 
Recent Re-Organisation of company         0.002 0.850 -0.002 0.844 -0.003 0.826 
New technology introduced          0.032 0.005 0.021 0.058 0.020 0.074 
New Chief Executive/equivalent          0.010 0.464 0.008 0.553 0.008 0.547 
Introduction of Family Friendly policy         0.018 0.138 -0.015 0.246 -0.016 0.221 
Participation             0.064 0.000 0.053 0.000 
Consultation (ordinal)             0.035 0.000 0.038 0.000 
Performance reward systems             0.038 0.000 0.041 0.000 
Progressive employment policies             0.004 0.533 0.004 0.545 
Flexible working arrangements             0.007 0.200 0.007 0.251 
Interaction Training*Participation                 0.021 0.361 
Interaction Training*Consultation                 -0.008 0.430 
Interaction Training*Perf Rew Sys                 -0.007 0.497 
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Table 6: Propensity Score Estimate impact of training on wages 
Method  ATT Std. Error T 
Nearest Neighbour  .025 .016 1.548 
Radius .036 .031 1.155 
Kernel  .043 .012 3.655 
Stratification  .039 .014 2.790 
 Coeff  Std. Error P 
OLS  .027 .012 .029 
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